The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, signed on August 7 by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan, represents the first formalization of the slow emergence of a conservative Sunni Islamic bloc intended to provide a strategic counterweight against both Israel and Iran. In recent months, many Middle East analysts have taken note of this nascent development.
The implications of the emergence of this bloc are already more than symbolic. It has its foundations in existing and growing bilateral ties between these countries in the fields of trade and economic relations and military cooperation, and is not only a matter of declarations.
The Mecca pact does not include all members of this axis. In their different ways, Qatar and the emergent regime in Syria are both components of the emerging bloc. Indeed, in many ways these countries are a more natural fit for membership than Saudi Arabia. The pact is therefore significant mainly because it indicates that Riyadh seeks at least one foot in this emergent axis.
Israel should be watching the slow crystallization of this bloc carefully. Jerusalem, and Islamic claims there, are likely to form the symbolic element that knits the emergent group together. Symbols, and especially Jerusalem, often end up acquiring practical political and sometimes military form, as has been witnessed in the region over the last three years.
The Mecca pact was announced with portentous language, which promised more than it looks set to immediately fulfill. According to the key part of the joint statement: “The agreement is intended to strengthen collective deterrence against any act of aggression, and stipulates that any armed attack against any one of the three states shall be regarded as an attack against them all. It further provides for the enhancement of all aspects of defense cooperation among the three states.”
Trilateral pact seeks to replicate NATO's Article 5, treating an attack on one as an attack on all
This sounds – and is intended to sound – like an unambiguous joint military guarantee, reminiscent of NATO’s Article 5, according to which an armed attack against one alliance member “shall be considered an attack against them all.”
No one, however, seriously believes that the Mecca pact obliges, say, Turkey to enter war against India if Pakistan is attacked by it, or Pakistan to fight Iran if the IRGC or one of its proxies attacks Saudi Arabia. The latter instance, indeed, has already been tested with subsequent Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia, predictably triggering no response from Riyadh’s new fellow Mecca pact members. No one also expects Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella to now be extended over Saudi Arabia and Turkey either.
In this regard, it is worth remembering that NATO’s Article 5 itself does not oblige member states to declare or enter war against a country attacking a fellow NATO member. Rather, Article 5 only requires a member state, in such an eventuality, to “take such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force.” The Mecca pact is more vague and does not detail what an attack “on one member as an attack against all” is supposed to imply.
But while the declaration contains less than meets the eye, this should not lead to the conclusion that the emergence of the Mecca pact is entirely without significance.
The core element in it is the bilateral relationship between Turkey and Pakistan. The steady growth and solidifying of strategic and defense ties between these two countries over the last decade has been a notable element of the regional strategic picture.
In a deal worth $1.5 billion in 2018, Pakistan’s navy purchased four MILGEM-class ships from Turkey. The deal constituted Turkey’s largest single defense export agreement. The two countries are cooperating on drone development. Turkey has helped upgrade Pakistan’s fleet of F-16 fighter bombers. Turkey is today Pakistan’s fourth-largest supplier of arms (the largest is China).
Ankara and Islamabad are united by a similar outlook combining conservative Sunni political Islam with an assertive, increasingly militant stance toward rivals. The Mecca pact is intended to form a component in the formalization of growing practical ties between these allies.
Saudi Arabia’s place at this particular table is more complex. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman was, until the outbreak of war in the region three years ago, often grouped alongside the leaders of the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain as one of a group of emergent Gulf leaders seeking to transcend old allegiances and rivalries, and move closer to Israel as part of an orientation geared toward economic and technological development.
The Abraham Accords of 2020 represented the organizational manifestation of this trend. It should not be assumed that Riyadh has conclusively abandoned this orientation. But in the new post-October 7 Middle East, military defense and religious and civilizational symbolic loyalties are very much back front and center.
In this environment, Riyadh has noted well what currently looks like the failure of the US to achieve its war aims against Iran, or to adequately defend Gulf countries against Iranian attacks. The more general desire of Washington to withdraw from major commitments in the Middle East has surely also been noted.
Saudis hedge to signal to the US and regional allies that they have other options
This does not mean that Saudi Arabia is now placing its trust in Islamabad or Ankara for its defense. It does mean that the Saudis are hedging, and want to convey to the US and its regional allies that they have options, and many potential partners (even ones who, in practical terms, can apparently promise little in kinetic terms against Iran and its proxies).
Even after the current agreement, Saudi Arabia remains a sought-after outlier in the emergent Sunni alliance, rather than a core component of it. Other than Turkey and Pakistan, the third key member of the group is Qatar, with extensive ties and a common outlook to both of these countries.
From an Israeli point of view, a number of elements regarding this alliance (Turkey-Pakistan-Qatar) should be noted: it is on the rhetorical level jointly and extremely anti-Israel.
A week ago, Pakistani defense minister Khawaja Asif called for a “united military front” of the Islamic world against Israel. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan recently said, “Zionism threatens not only me, not only our party, not only our alliance; it threatens everyone,” and so on. The rhetoric is also backed up by actions. Turkey and Qatar are, along with Iran, the main practical supporters of Hamas.
Lastly, there is an additional member of this alliance: the emerging Sunni Islamist regime of Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa. Turkey and Qatar are the main allies of that new regime. Ankara is currently engaged in the building of a 200,000-strong new Syrian army, controlled and staffed by Sunni Islamist commanders.
A recent Channel 11 news report revealed that an unnamed Middle East country had advised another unnamed Middle East country to conclude an agreement with Israel in order to buy time and build strength before breaking the agreement and launching war with Israel.
While the names of the countries were not revealed, Middle Eastern strategic logic would suggest that the advised country was almost certainly Syria, and the advising one either Turkey or Qatar.
This appears to indicate that the anti-Israel statements of this emergent alliance are not just rhetoric. Rather, they form an integral element in its strategy. Strategic planners in Jerusalem should be taking careful note.