When Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa swept into power and ousted Bashar Assad in December 2024, Israel quickly implemented policies born of the lessons learned from October 7.
The first was to act before threats metastasize rather than after. The second was never again to let those who want to murder you encamp right on the border.
As a result, the IDF rapidly entered Syria, destroyed planes, helicopters, naval vessels, missiles, chemical weapons depots, air bases, and ports belonging to the Assad regime before they could fall into the hands of jihadist groups.
It also carved out a buffer zone inside southern Syria designed to keep forces hostile to Israel from establishing themselves within easy striking distance of communities on the Golan Heights.
Again, the trauma of October 7 looms large.
Washington views Israeli presence in Syria as a problem
This buffer zone, together with the ones Israel has created inside Gaza and southern Lebanon, is now increasingly viewed in Washington as a problem that needs to be solved.
US President Donald Trump gave voice to that sentiment during a phone call with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu last week, first reported by Axios, in which he reportedly urged Israel to begin withdrawing from southern Syria.
“They don’t want you there. You should redeploy,” Trump reportedly told Netanyahu.
Again, he sees Israel’s presence in Syria as a problem. Israel sees it as a solution.
With the exception of a handful of far-right activists who dream of establishing settlements across the border, Israel has no territorial ambitions in southern Syria.
The one exception is Mount Hermon, whose strategic importance is so overwhelming that Israeli leaders have made clear they have little intention of relinquishing it.
The same is not necessarily true regarding the rest of the buffer zone.
The question has never really been whether Israel will eventually leave, but under what conditions.
Trump, apparently impressed by Sharaa following their meeting on the sidelines of last week’s NATO summit, appears convinced that the new Syrian leader deserves the opportunity to extend his authority over the entire country.
Continued Israeli control of territory, from this perspective, only weakens his ability to stabilize Syria and consolidate his rule.
Israel is considerably less convinced. Jerusalem wants to judge Syria’s new leadership not by its words but by its actions and not over weeks or months but over years.
That difference reflects something much larger than a disagreement over some 350 sq.km. of Syrian territory.
It reflects two very different conclusions drawn from the post-October 7 Middle East.
Before Hamas’s attack, Israel’s security doctrine rested heavily on deterrence, intelligence, sophisticated border barriers, and rapid military response. October 7 shattered confidence in all four.
October 7 triggered fundamental shift in Israeli security doctrine
The result has been a fundamental shift in Israel’s security doctrine.
Rather than relying exclusively on fences and warning systems, Israel increasingly seeks physical depth between hostile forces and Israeli civilians.
The reasoning is simple: enemies cannot launch another October 7 and swarm into people’s homes if they are prevented from massing directly on the border.
That thinking first manifested itself in Gaza, where Israel established what is now known as the Yellow Line, a broad sterile zone separating Hamas from Israeli communities.
It then guided Israel’s decision to establish a buffer zone in southern Syria.
And it now shapes Israeli policy in southern Lebanon, where Jerusalem insists Hezbollah must never again be permitted to rebuild military infrastructure adjacent to the border.
From Washington’s perspective, however, buffer zones become increasingly difficult to justify if there is a functioning government on the other side willing to keep the peace.
The Trump administration appears to believe that strengthening Sharaa’s government, encouraging economic development, and restoring Syrian sovereignty offer the best long-term path toward stability.
That explains its push for Israeli withdrawals.
Jerusalem remains skeptical.
Officials here remember that Hamas, too, periodically spoke about governing Gaza responsibly while quietly preparing for October 7.
Israeli memory of Assad-era Syria calls for caution over optimism
They remember as well that Assad, despite decades of hostility toward Israel, largely upheld the 1974 disengagement agreement until the Syrian civil war created an opening for Iran and Hezbollah to establish themselves throughout the country.
For many in Jerusalem, those experiences argue for caution rather than optimism.
The question is not simply whether Sharaa seeks peace today. It is whether he will still be able – or willing – to prevent hostile forces from operating near Israel’s border three years from now, five years from now, or after the next upheaval in Syria.
There is another factor reinforcing Israeli caution: Turkey, Sharaa’s principal external backer. That matters because Israel increasingly sees Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan not merely as a difficult regional actor, but as a potential long-term threat.
While Iran’s regional influence has been significantly degraded over the past year, Turkey is flexing its muscles and wants to step into the vacuum and expand its own influence across Syria and the broader Middle East.
Jerusalem worries that a rapid Israeli withdrawal could ultimately create space not only for Syrian government forces but also for Turkish-backed militias or other Islamist actors operating under Damascus’s umbrella.
From Israel’s perspective, replacing an Iranian sphere of influence immediately on its border with a Turkish one would hardly constitute progress.
This helps explain why Jerusalem’s assessment differs so sharply from Washington’s.
The US sees a Syrian government that deserves an opportunity to establish sovereignty over all its territory. Israel sees a fragile state, backed by a regional power whose intentions it deeply distrusts.
None of this means Israel intends to remain in southern Syria indefinitely. But it does suggest that Jerusalem is in no great hurry to withdraw. It wants sustained proof that Syria has fundamentally changed before dismantling one of the principal security measures put in place after October 7.
And then there is politics.
Netanyahu unwilling to risk withdrawing from buffer zone
With elections only a little more than three months away, Netanyahu will not take any step that opponents could portray as weakening Israel’s security by dismantling a buffer zone established to prevent another October 7-style catastrophe.
That is why, despite Trump’s reported request, the chances of an Israeli withdrawal from southern Syria before Israelis go to the polls are virtually nonexistent.
The debate between Washington and Jerusalem is ultimately not about a strip of Syrian territory.
It is about whether the lessons of October 7 require Israel to maintain physical security buffers beyond its borders or whether diplomacy, new governments, and international understandings are once again sufficient.
For the Trump administration, the answer increasingly appears to be yes. For Israel, at least in Syria, the answer remains an emphatic no.