Reading the Jeddah statement
Asharq Al-Awsat, UK, May 3
The Gulf summit held in Jeddah last Tuesday came at a highly sensitive moment, effectively between two truces: a temporary military one and a political one yet to fully take shape.
In such moments, final communiqués are not mere diplomatic language but political documents reflecting a collective awareness of the threat, the limits of response, and the possible paths forward. From this perspective, the Jeddah statement signals a new phase of Gulf cohesion – not just reactive, but rooted in redefining security as a shared responsibility.
One of its most striking features is the clarity in naming the threat: the leaders did not settle for vague references to “escalation,” but explicitly framed Iranian actions as attacks on infrastructure and civilian facilities, marking a shift from traditional caution to greater candor. At the same time, the statement avoids open-ended escalation, balancing deterrence with diplomacy.
Calling for a diplomatic track does not signal weakness, but reflects an understanding that stability in a region like the Gulf cannot be built on force alone, and that wars are costly – particularly for the Iranian people themselves. However, diplomacy here is not unconditional; it is tied to rebuilding trust, implicitly acknowledging how far that trust has eroded.
The central idea in the statement is that Gulf security is “indivisible,” a phrase that dominated regional headlines and reflects a practical reality: any attack – whether from Iran or its proxies – immediately impacts all Gulf states across energy, economic, and security domains. Elevating this into a clear political commitment marks a shift from solidarity to collective security.
The reaffirmation of the right to self-defense within the UN Charter adds a legal dimension, strengthening the Gulf’s position internationally. The statement also highlights sources of strength, praising the effectiveness of Gulf armed forces and their ability to counter missiles and drones – sending a message both externally and domestically.
The emphasis on rapid restoration of energy facilities is equally significant, signaling that disruption is no longer as effective a -pressure tool. Economically, the statement underscores the link between security and energy, recognizing the Gulf as a vital node in the global economy.
Any threat to maritime routes, especially the Strait of Hormuz, is thus framed as a global concern. The firm rejection of closing the strait or restricting navigation reinforces that freedom of passage is a shared international interest, not a bargaining chip. The call for restoring conditions to pre-February 2026 further frames recent developments as disruptions to be corrected, not accepted.
The statement also points to long-term responses, including accelerating infrastructure integration – transport, rail, electricity, and pipelines bypassing Hormuz – strengthening resilience through interconnected interests. Similarly, emphasis on early warning systems and military integration reflects an advanced understanding of modern threats that require collective responses.
In sum, the Jeddah statement is not just a reaction, but a deliberate step in redefining Gulf security and safeguarding its economic and strategic model.
– Mohammed Al Rumaihi
Forgetting Gaza
Al-Masry Al-Youm, Egypt, May 2
The Gaza Strip has become the first victim of the fourth Gulf war, which has cast a dark shadow over the humanitarian catastrophe in the enclave – a catastrophe that has reached levels of devastation not only from Israeli firepower but also from disease, hunger, and the collapse of basic living conditions.
Gaza has endured extremely harsh circumstances, reflecting the severity of suffering accumulated over time. This has unfolded just as faint signs of hope had begun to emerge, including growing international recognition of a Palestinian state and the launch of President Donald Trump’s peace initiative announced in Sharm El-Sheikh.
The early steps toward forming a governing framework for Gaza were not easy, as the creation of a peace council and administrative body faced doubts and hesitation, yet both ultimately materialized despite lingering concerns. However, as these developments were taking shape, the broader regional war was expanding.
What might be called the first Iranian war in June 2025, marked by US-Israeli strikes on Iran, did not truly end, and by early 2026, unrest had spread inside Iran itself, followed by renewed escalation targeting Tehran’s leadership, infrastructure, and society.
In this widening conflict, Gaza became just one front among many, as theaters of war stretched across Iran, the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Oman, and the Strait of Hormuz, alongside simultaneous tensions in the Gulf region.
Additional fronts emerged in Lebanon and Iraq, driven by Iranian-aligned militias, while the prospect of escalation in the Red Sea loomed as another potential pressure point on global trade routes. These overlapping conflicts have blended into a single, complex war, leaving Gaza’s humanitarian, political, and strategic crisis increasingly overshadowed.
The various actors have become absorbed in a regional conflict spanning multiple fronts, with militias playing a central role in destabilizing Arab states such as Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria. Israel, meanwhile, has expanded its military reach, redrawing boundaries through force, while Gaza remains trapped in a continuing war without a clear resolution.
Arab states have focused primarily on preventing escalation and containing conflicts when they erupt, yet the situation demands more than crisis management – it requires a comprehensive strategy capable of addressing Gaza’s crisis while also stabilizing the broader Arab region. – Abdel Moneim Saeed
Iran will not return to what it was
Al-Bayan, UAE, May 3
Regardless of how the US-Israeli war on Iran and Iran’s attacks on Gulf states ultimately end, it is extremely difficult to imagine that Iran will return to the condition it was in before the outbreak of war on February 28.
The question of what Iran’s future will look like invites sharply different possibilities. One scenario envisions Iran apologizing to Gulf states and becoming a more conventional actor pursuing good neighborly relations within its Arab and Islamic environment, while another points toward increased radicalization and isolation.
The shock for Gulf countries was profound, particularly given that they had clearly opposed the US-Israeli strike on Iran and had communicated to Tehran that their territories and airspace would not be used as launch points for such attacks.
Prior to the war, Iran maintained a contradictory posture: it sustained diplomatic relations with Gulf capitals while simultaneously expanding its influence through affiliated militias across the region, including in Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, before the fall of its allied regime there. This dual approach allowed Iran to claim it sought cooperation while acting otherwise.
With the direct attacks on Gulf states, this contradiction has effectively collapsed. Looking ahead, several possible trajectories emerge depending on how the crisis concludes.
One possibility is the resumption of large-scale military operations by the United States and Israel if negotiations fail entirely, potentially leading to severe strikes on Iran’s remaining military, scientific, and economic infrastructure, including oil facilities, and possibly even limited ground operations that could force systemic change or compel acceptance of sweeping conditions related to nuclear activities, proxy networks, and maritime security.
Another, far less likely scenario is a withdrawal of US forces from the region, which current realities do not support. A third possibility involves the war ending in its current form, with both sides claiming victory while entering a prolonged state of neither war nor peace.
In such a scenario, Iran might continue to restrict navigation in Hormuz while the United States maintains pressure on Iranian ports, gradually weakening the Iranian system by depriving it of key revenues and potentially setting the stage for internal change over time.
In all cases, the decisive factor will be how the conflict ends, but it remains highly unlikely that Iran will revert to its prewar state. As has been noted by senior Gulf officials, Iran represents a long-term strategic challenge, and rebuilding trust will be a complex and extended process requiring firm and coordinated regional positions to prevent a recurrence of such confrontations.
– Emad El-Din Hussein
Is the Western umbrella eroding?
Al Rai, Kuwait, May 1
The Gulf region is experiencing a pivotal historical moment amid the US-Israeli war on Iran, as the consequences of the conflict extend far beyond the battlefield to affect the structure of the international system, the cohesion of the Western alliance, and the future of regional security.
As oil prices rise and markets fluctuate, fundamental questions emerge: who protects the Gulf, and who will shape the next global order? The region is no longer a peripheral arena of influence but has become central to the reconfiguration of global balances.
Its geographic position, control over energy flows, and deep integration into global trade have made it one of the areas most directly impacted by the war, particularly given that roughly 20 million barrels of oil pass daily through the Strait of Hormuz.
With the escalation of military operations, vital infrastructure across Gulf states – including energy facilities and airports – has been targeted, causing disruptions to supply chains, trade, and food systems.
One of the most significant developments revealed by the war is the relative fragmentation within the Western alliance. While the United States has taken an active military role, Europe has appeared more cautious, and NATO has shown signs of limited cohesion. This divergence reflects not only differing interests but also a deeper transformation in the nature of Western leadership.
At the same time, shifts in global power are becoming more apparent, with countries such as China and Russia playing increasingly prominent roles, reinforcing a trend toward a multipolar international system and reducing reliance on a single dominant power.
Economically, the war has produced a global shock, pushing oil prices above $100 per barrel and creating instability across energy, gas, and fertilizer markets. While higher oil prices may generate short-term gains for Gulf economies, they are accompanied by risks such as declining investment, reduced tourism, and heightened geopolitical uncertainty.
Within this context, Kuwait faces a complex equation of opportunities and challenges. Economically, it may benefit from increased revenues, but such gains remain fragile in the face of potential disruptions and capital flight.
From a security perspective, pressures are mounting on defense systems, particularly in light of possible indirect or cyber threats, necessitating rapid modernization. Politically, Kuwait must carefully balance its alliance with the United States while avoiding deeper entanglement in confrontation with Iran, highlighting the continued importance of its diplomatic role as a regional mediator.
The current situation can be interpreted through several potential scenarios, ranging from limited containment to broader regional escalation, prolonged low-intensity conflict, or even a restructuring of the regional order. Across all scenarios, the defining feature is a decline in strategic certainty.
In response, Kuwait must move beyond traditional security models toward a strategy that includes diversifying international partnerships, strengthening defense and technological capabilities, accelerating economic diversification, and enhancing diplomatic engagement.
The post-war environment will not resemble what came before, and the Gulf is no longer merely an affected region but a testing ground for the emerging global order. – Mohammed Al-Rashed ■
Translated by Asaf Zilberfarb. All assertions, opinions, facts, and information presented in these articles are the sole responsibility of their respective authors and are not necessarily those of The Media Line, which assumes no responsibility for their content.