The war Israel is preparing for may not be the one ahead - opinion

One of the most common mistakes in Israeli public discourse is the tendency to interpret major developments through the prism of transient political figures such as Donald Trump, Benjamin Netanyahu, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, or Vladimir Putin.

Leaders matter, but they are not the central story. The real story is the geopolitical upheaval unfolding before our eyes, a structural transformation that may reshape the Middle East and redefine Israel’s strategic position for decades to come.

For decades, Israel operated under the assumption that the world was fundamentally unipolar and that Washington was the primary address for every major strategic challenge.

Yet, the American trajectory is increasingly clear. After Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States seeks to reduce its direct involvement in prolonged regional conflicts and expects allies to shoulder a greater share of the security burden.

At the same time, global centers of economic, political, and technological power are gradually shifting eastward and southward. In a fragmented and multipolar world, a small state cannot afford to rely exclusively on a single strategic pillar, however indispensable that pillar may be.

While Israeli policymakers remain focused on Iran, the more complex long-term challenge may ultimately emerge from Ankara.

Iran is undoubtedly dangerous. Yet its ideological rigidity often isolates it internationally and limits its room for maneuver. Turkey presents an entirely different challenge.

Turkey combines a developed economy and advanced military capabilities with a distinctly neo-Ottoman worldview. Significant segments of the Turkish elite increasingly see their country as the legitimate heir to the Ottoman legacy, seeking influence across the Balkans, the Caucasus, North Africa, and the Levant.

In this worldview, Israel is often perceived not merely as a regional competitor, but as an alien entity occupying what many Turkish strategists still regard as former Ottoman space.

Ankara has translated these ambitions into concrete policy. It has established a military presence in northern Syria, expanded its influence in Libya and the Caucasus, strengthened its foothold in Africa, and promoted regional infrastructure initiatives such as Iraq’s Development Road project, designed in part to bypass Israel as the primary land bridge between Asia and Europe.

Ankara masterfully exploited, and some would argue actively accelerated, the disintegration of Syria to advance its geopolitical position toward Israel’s northern border.

It now appears determined to replicate elements of this strategy in Lebanon by expanding its political, economic, religious, and security influence there.

The acute concern is that Turkey may seek to exploit Israel’s strategic exhaustion after nearly three years of continuous warfare to establish a deeper foothold along Israel’s northern strategic flank.

The rivalry between Israel and Turkey is therefore not simply a product of Erdogan’s policies. It reflects a deeper geopolitical competition between two regional powers with conflicting interests in security, trade, energy, and regional influence. Even in a post-Erdogan era, this structural competition is unlikely to disappear.

The danger for Israel is not that Turkey will become another Iran. The danger is that Turkey may emerge as the dominant regional power while Israel continues to think in terms of the Middle East of the 1990s.

By the time Jerusalem recognizes the strategic shift, the regional balance of power may already have been fundamentally altered.

If proof is needed that the Israeli-Turkish rivalry extends far beyond rhetoric and can directly affect core security initiatives, one need only look at the Kurdish issue.

For decades, Israel’s security doctrine relied on the “Alliance of the Periphery,” cultivating ties with non-Arab actors on the margins of the Middle East. The Kurds in Iraq and Syria were seen in Jerusalem as natural pro-Western allies and as a strategic lever against hostile regimes.

According to multiple reports, during the recent confrontation with Iran, Jerusalem and Washington examined advanced plans to leverage Kurdish militias to open an additional internal front against Tehran. What appeared in Jerusalem as a rare strategic opportunity was perceived in Ankara as an existential threat.

Turkey responded forcefully. Through diplomatic pressure, economic leverage, and military signaling, Ankara reportedly succeeded in influencing American priorities and blocking the initiative.

For Israel, the lesson is stark: Turkey is not a bystander. It is a regional power with sufficient leverage to constrain Israeli initiatives, shape Washington’s calculations, and turn an Israeli strategic opportunity into a strategic liability.

The greater danger for nations is to win today’s wars while losing tomorrow’s strategic competition because they failed to recognize changes in the international system.

Alongside managing immediate security challenges, Israel must begin thinking in terms of decades rather than election cycles.

This means expanding strategic ties with emerging centers of power such as India, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore, while simultaneously deepening regional partnerships with Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt. It also requires cultivating long-term relationships in Africa, Eastern Europe, and Latin America.

These partnerships should not replace the alliance with the United States, which remains indispensable, but rather complement it in an increasingly competitive world.

Israel possesses a rare combination of military power, technological superiority, intelligence capabilities, innovation, and human capital. The question is not whether Israel has the tools to shape its environment. The question is whether it possesses the strategic will to use them.

Ultimately, Israel must decide whether it wishes to remain a state that primarily reacts to regional developments or evolve into a power capable of shaping the regional order itself.