Gadi Eisenkot is undoubtedly one of the most prominent figures in Israeli politics today and is widely perceived as a leading alternative to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the Right, arguably more so than any other figure in the opposition bloc.
Eisenkot’s party, Yashar!, has been steadily rising in the polls and currently stands at 16 seats. At the same time, Eisenkot has succeeded in attracting high-profile public figures, including former Shin Bet chief Yoram Cohen.
Despite this momentum, Eisenkot’s political entry was somewhat unsteady. His decision to join the National Unity party led by Benny Gantz, alongside Gideon Sa’ar, resulted in a disappointing outcome of just 12 seats.
However, the judicial reform initiative and the mass protests that followed returned Gantz and Eisenkot to the center of the political stage, with many Israelis viewing them as a bridge between Right and Left.
Their standing rose further after the October 7 massacre and their subsequent entry into the national emergency government and war cabinet. Yet disagreements with Netanyahu and their eventual withdrawal from the government carried a high political cost: from a peak of 37 seats in February 2024 polls, support fell sharply to just 9 by June 2025.
Following his split from Gantz and the establishment of a new party in July 2025, Eisenkot entered a complex and crowded political arena, particularly within the anti-Netanyahu bloc. At that stage, Naftali Bennett had emerged as Netanyahu’s primary challenger.
By December 2025, Eisenkot’s momentum appeared limited, with polls giving him just seven seats, while Bennett trailed Netanyahu at 22 to 25.
Eisenkot gains massive support
Over the past six months, however, Eisenkot’s position has undergone a notable turnaround, more than doubling his support. Bennett, likely seeking to curb this trend, allied with Yair Lapid. As a result, the gap between them now stands at seven seats, 23 to 16.
This development places Eisenkot at the center of a strategic dilemma, particularly amid growing discussion of a potential merger with Avigdor Lieberman and his party, Yisrael Beiteinu. On the one hand, Eisenkot’s upward trajectory raises the question of whether such a merger is necessary.
Past experience suggests that alliances with Lieberman do not necessarily yield electoral gains, as illustrated by the Likud-Yisrael Beiteinu joint list in 2013. Similarly, the Bennett-Lapid alliance, which thus far appears underwhelming, may serve as a cautionary example.
On the other hand, the Bennett-Lapid alliance has, at least temporarily, widened the gap between Bennett and Eisenkot. The political landscape increasingly resembles a two-bloc contest between Likud and Bennett’s camp.
In such conditions, as seen in previous elections, some voters may shift strategically toward Bennett to ensure his bloc finishes first.
From this perspective, a merger with Lieberman could alter the dynamics, potentially transforming the race into a three-way contest over which party emerges as the largest.
Moreover, unlike Bennett, whose alliance with Lapid has shifted him toward the center-Left, a partnership with Lieberman could position Eisenkot further to the Right, broadening his appeal.
In conclusion, Gadi Eisenkot stands at a critical political crossroads that is likely to shape the remainder of his campaign. His dilemma is clear: whether to capitalize on his current momentum independently or to consolidate strength through an alliance.
Yet a central strategic priority appears to be securing a decisive advantage over Bennett, his principal rival within the bloc.
A potential merger with Lieberman could, in electoral terms, position Eisenkot at the forefront of the camp, thereby enhancing his capacity to mount a more direct and competitive challenge to Netanyahu.
The writer is a lecturer and research fellow at the University of South Wales, UK. Author of Collapse: Israeli Labor Party 1992-2024.