Haredi conscription debate threatens long-standing Israeli coalitions - opinion

It could not only precipitate early elections and bring an end to the long-standing alliance between the Right and the ultra-Orthodox parties, but also relegate the latter to the opposition for years to come, particularly in light of their insistence on preserving the status quo regarding the conscription of haredim into the IDF.

For decades, much of the Israeli public has operated under the assumption that no government can be formed without the ultra-Orthodox parties, and that their political influence exceeds their demographic weight. Indeed, Israel’s political history since the 1992 elections suggests that, regardless of whether the Right or the center-left prevailed, the ultra-Orthodox parties, Shas and UTJ, have typically played a pivotal role in coalition governments.

Following the Labor Party’s decisive victory under Yitzhak Rabin in 1992, a center-left coalition was formed with Shas, then an emerging force within haredi society. Despite the seemingly incongruous partnership, given that Shas represented Mizrahi haredim, a constituency that already leaned toward the political Right, Rabin chose to include the party to bridge social and political divides.

This partnership dissolved within a year, following the indictment of Aryeh Deri and a High Court ruling requiring his dismissal. These developments also aligned with Shas’s discomfort with the emerging Oslo Accords, which ran counter to prevailing sentiment within the ultra-Orthodox public.

A similar pattern unfolded after the 1999 elections, when Ehud Barak brought both Shas and UTJ into his coalition, expecting that their participation would help stabilize his government as he pursued negotiations with the Palestinians. Yet this partnership also proved short-lived. UTJ withdrew after Barak permitted the Israel Electric Corporation to carry out work on Shabbat, while Shas exited following his decision to attend the Camp David Summit.

Although the haredi parties remained outside the government for much of Ariel Sharon’s tenure, from 2001 to 2006, they soon returned to their familiar role as key coalition partners, first under Ehud Olmert, and then throughout most of Netanyahu’s premierships, with the notable exception of the period between 2013 and 2015.

Since the 2015 elections, they have become an integral component of Netanyahu’s bloc. In the most recent elections, they secured a combined 18 seats, nearly double their strength compared to three decades ago.

In the post-October 7 reality, however, amid a protracted war that has stretched on for over two years, the limitations of this approach have become unmistakably clear. As the IDF calls for expanded recruitment to sustain its operational capacity and relieve an overburdened reserve force, the longstanding exemption of haredim from military service has moved to the center of public debate.

This stance is increasingly perceived by the broader Israeli public as untenable. As a result, it is entirely plausible that, following the 2026 elections, the ultra-Orthodox parties will find themselves excluded from governing coalitions and consigned to the opposition for an extended period.